has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM). Thus, if Campbell is right, it would not be true that when the subject makes a mental self-ascription on the basis of introspective awareness of a given mental state, there is no possible world in which she could be wrong as to whether it is really she who has that mental state.
Notice the interesting interdisciplinary implications of Campbell's project: on the one hand, a fairly precise notion elaborated in philosophy such as IEM (and the related notion of error through misidentification [EM] ) is used to describe a characteristic symptom of schizophrenia.
1 On the other hand, such a phenomenon, described in the way proposed, is taken to be a possible counterexample to a sort of philosophical dogma such as IEM of introspection-based noninferential mental self-ascriptions.
In the first section of the paper, I will point out the characteristic features of EM and explain logical immunity to error through misidentification of introspection-based mental self-ascriptions; in the second section I will consider the case of thought insertion in more detail and show why, after all, it is not a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are logically IEM. Finally, I will offer a redescription of the phenomenon of thought insertion.
Error Through Misidentification and Logical Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
For our purposes, it is enough to characterize error through misidentification as a kind of error that can affect both physical and mental selfascriptions, as well as judgments about other objects and individuals, once these judgments are causally and rationally grounded on a belief in an identification component. For instance, the judgment "My hair is blowing in the wind" can be based on the observation of myself on a shop window. In such an event, by forming the judgment, I also acquire a related structure of beliefs (that I need not entertain in a process of conscious inference, but that are such that I should have the conceptual resources to entertain them) such as "That person's hair is blowing in the wind," where I am that person. Now, if a mistake occurs in the latter identification component, then EM will affect the resulting I judgment. Hence, a judgment is liable to EM if and only if its grounds contain an identification component and it is affected by EM if and only if that identification component is wrong.
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For our purposes it is enough to characterize IEM as follows:
A singular judgment of the form [A is F], made on certain grounds, is IEM if and only if the subject who is making the judgment on those bases cannot be wrong as to whether it is A who is (or appears to be) F, because her judgment is not rationally and causally based on any belief in an identification component.
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For instance, if the subject judges (e.g., "I am in pain") on introspective awareness of her pain, her judgment cannot be wrong (at least) as to whether it is she herself who is in pain. The question is why such a self-ascription is IEM and, moreover, is so in any logically possible world. The distinction between de facto and logical IEM is due to Sydney Shoemaker (1968) and was originally understood as follows 4 : some selfascriptions such as bodily ones made on the basis of somatic proprioception are IEM in this world; they are IEM if they are made on the basis of information received from the body in which one's brain is located. However, they could be affected by EM if they were made in a logically possible world in which subjects are hooked up to someone else's body as well and can receive information from that body. By contrast, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions would be IEM in any logically possible world. However, it has to be noted that for this distinction to make sense it has to be relativized (at least) not only to logically possible worlds, but also to the epistemic situation of the subjects in those possible worlds. That is to say, if EM/IEM have to do with the subject's grounds for her judgment, it is not enough to make a bodily self-ascription EM that the subject be plunged into a world where different physical conditions obtain. Rather, she should also be aware that she might be receiving information from someone else's body, so that her bodily self-ascription can be actually seen as grounded on a mistaken belief in the identity between her body and the body she is receiving information from.
The reason why one cannot make an error through misidentification when one is self-ascribing a mental property on the basis of one's introspective awareness of that mental property is that, minimally, introspective awareness is a form of awareness that does not involve either observation or inference. That is to say, when the subject is self-ascribing pain on the basis of being introspectively aware of that pain, she is not making such a self-ascription on the basis of the observation of herself as an object whose behavior is taken to be a symptom of such a mental state and which is a reason for ascribing that state. Rather, the self-ascription is based on one's being in that very mental state. That is, it is the very occurrence of the mental state that intimates its self-ascription in conceptually endowed creatures.
5 Be that as it may, the important point is that because the self-ascription is not based on the observation of oneself, then it cannot be grounded on any identification component and, therefore, it cannot be affected by EM. What has still to be explained, however, is why self-ascriptions based on introspective awareness of the corresponding mental state are logically IEM, that is, IEM in any logically possible world.
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Let us tackle this issue by considering what it means to say that a subject is introspectively aware of pain. If a subject is introspectively aware of pain, this just means that she is feeling pain. Similarly, if a subject is introspectively aware of the belief that it is sunny today, then this just means that she is actually believing that today is sunny. Hence, it is a matter of conceptual truth that if a subject is introspectively aware of a certain mental state, then she herself is having it and, therefore, that mental state is her own. We can put the point more vividly by considering that if, per impossibile, X were introspectively aware of Y's pain or Y's belief that it is sunny today, this would mean that X herself would be feeling pain or believing that it is sunny today. Hence, that pain or belief would be X's own.
Thus, it follows that the subject who is introspectively aware of a certain mental property is necessarily the same as the one who has it and is in a position to self-ascribe it on that basis. As a consequence, a mental self-ascription made on the basis of introspective awareness of a certain mental state is IEM in any logically possible world. Hence, in self-ascribing pain or a certain belief on the basis of introspective awareness, the subject cannot be wrong as to whether it is she herself that is in pain or believes that it is sunny today.
Because it is a matter of conceptual truth that each mental state one is introspectively aware of is one's own, then it is so in any logically possible world. In other words, if, per impossibile, a subject could be introspectively aware of someone else's mental state, this would mean that the subject herself would be having that mental state, which would thus be her own. Hence, we can see that being introspectively aware of a certain mental state is a criterion of what has to count as one's own conscious mental state.
Notice the difference between the case of introspective awareness of one's mental states and the case of somatic proprioception. For, from the fact that one could be proprioceptively aware of someone else's bodily properties, it would not follow that the other body is one's own. This is so because we have independent, nonphenomenological criteria of identity for what has to count as one's own body. By contrast, we do not have criteria of identity for what has to count as one's own conscious mental state, which are independent of the fact that one is introspectively aware of it.
This indeed vindicates Shoemaker's famous observation that "in being aware that one feels pain one is, tautologically, aware, not simply that the attribute feels pain is instantiated, but that it is instantiated in oneself" (Shoemaker 1968, 89) . For the "tautology" has to do with the fact that we do not have an independent grasp of what it means for a conscious mental state to be one's own, but by reference to the fact that there is a subject who is introspectively aware of it. Similarly, our explanation of why it is a priori guaranteed that the subject who is introspectively aware of a mental property is the one who has that property explains why Shoemaker was right in saying that there are certain predicates (mental predicates), "each of which can be known to be instantiated in such a way that knowing it to be instantiated in that way [emphasis added] is equivalent to knowing it to be instantiated in oneself" (Shoemaker 1968, 90) . For if one knows that someone is in pain or believes that it is sunny today by being introspectively aware of that mental state, this means that one oneself is in pain or believes that it is sunny today, which in turn explains why one would know that that pain or belief is instantiated in oneself.
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To conclude, mental self-ascriptions based on introspective awareness of a certain mental state are logically IEM because there is an a priori guarantee, a conceptual guarantee, that any mental state one is introspectively aware of is one's own and there is no possibility of wrongly selfattributing someone else's mental state on that basis.
Thought Insertion and IEM
John Campbell has recently maintained that "the phenomenon of thought insertion as described by schizophrenic patients ( . . . ) seems to involve an error of identification" (Campbell 1999, 609) . He writes:
A patient who supposes that thoughts have been inserted into his mind by someone else is right about which thoughts they are, but wrong about whose thoughts they are. So thought insertion seems to be a counterexample to the thesis that present-tense introspectively based reports of psychological state cannot involve errors of identification. (Campbell 1999, 610) First of all, let us clarify the phenomenon of thought insertion. Campbell, as an example of the phenomenon at hand, uses the following report made by a schizophrenic patient: "Thoughts come into my head like 'Kill God.' It's just like my mind working, but it isn't. They come from this chap, Chris. They're his thoughts."
8 Before discussing the salient features of this report, let me point out that it should not be taken as a (perhaps metaphorical) expression of the fact that the subject thinks that her thoughts have been influenced by someone else. Rather, the report counts as an example of thought insertion only if it is taken literally. That is to say, if it is taken to express the fact that the subject thinks that the thoughts that are occurring in her mind, and of which she is introspectively aware, are in fact someone else's. 9 Notice, however, that for this report to be a counterexample to the thesis that present-tense introspectively based self-ascriptions of mental states are logically IEM, it should be expressed in the first person. But, interestingly, the subject is not saying "I am thinking 'Kill God.'" Rather, she is saying that Chris is thinking the thought, which is occurring in her mind. So, if anything, this report would show that it is conceivable to make third-person psychological ascriptions on the basis of introspective knowledge of someone else's mental states.
Notice, however, that this would not show yet that the relevant self-ascriptions are liable to EM. For EM is possible just in case one's grounds for the judgment involve a belief in an identification component. But from showing that introspective awareness could license third-personal psychological ascriptions, it does not follow that, when the former licenses first-personal ones, the latter are the result of a (not necessarily conscious) inferential process involving a belief in an identification component. Indeed, to suppose that this were so would run against the very understanding of introspective awareness here at stake. That is to say, introspective awareness of one's own mental states is to be understood at least in the minimal sense of awareness of one's own mental states that is neither observational nor inferential. Being neither observational nor inferential, then it cannot give rise to EM.
Let us now consider the claim that one may be introspectively aware of someone else's mental states in more detail. The case would be similar to alleged cases of telepathy, whereby subjects maintain that they are introspectively aware of someone else's mental states. At least the following three different interpretations of what telepathy could amount to are possible.
First, if we take the possibility of being introspectively aware of someone else's mental states seriously, then it would mean that Y's mental states are occurring in X's consciousness. For instance, Y's pain or belief that it is sunny today would be occurring in X's mind. But, then, X herself would be in pain or thinking that it is sunny today. Thus, that pain or that belief would be X's own. Hence, under this reading, telepathy would not represent a counterexample to the view that the mental states one is introspectively aware of are (logically) one's own. Thus, if X were to self-attribute the relevant mental state, then she would be right and her self-ascription would be logically IEM.
Moreover, telepathy so understood would license third-person psychological claims only on the basis of an independently observed correlation between one's own having a certain mental state and someone else's claim to be having that mental state too. For, absent such an independently observed correlation, the subject would not have any reason to suppose that the thought she is currently introspectively aware of is someone else's. Therefore, on this reading, introspective awareness of a mental state could serve as a ground for attributing that mental state to someone else only mediatedly.
Second, telepathy may be understood in a loose sense as a kind of awareness of someone else's mental states, which, however, does not make it the case that those states are occurring in one's consciousness. On this reading, telepathy would be more a case of empathy. That is to say, X can be aware, although not really introspectively, of the fact that Y is suffering or believing that it is sunny today. But this does not mean that X is in pain herself (unless Y's pain causes X to be in pain herself; in this case, however, if X were to self-attribute pain she would be right). Nor does this mean that X herself believes that it is sunny today. Moreover, X's report would be either "I'm feeling that Y is in pain" or, equivalently, "I'm aware that Y is in pain" or, in the case of the belief, "I am aware that Y believes that it is sunny today." So X would not be erroneously self-attributing Y's pain or belief; she would just be saying that she is aware of someone else's pain or belief. Hence, neither the first understanding of telepathy nor the second are counterexamples to the view that mental states one is introspectively aware of are (logically) one's own and if one were to self-attribute them, then the self-ascription would be logically IEM.
Third, one may think that telepathy consists of introspective awareness of someone else's mental states, where the operation of some cognitive mechanism differentiates between those mental states that are one's own and those that belong to someone else. One might then argue that, if such a mechanism fails to work properly, a subject may be introspectively aware of someone else's mental states and wrongly take them to be one's own. Notice, however, that in this latter case the malfunctioning of the mechanism would be enough for making the mental states be one's own. Hence, this reading of telepathy would not be a counterexample to the view that mental states one is introspectively aware of are one's own. Conversely, one may think that the malfunctioning of such a mechanism could make one attribute one's own thoughts to someone else. Now, this could only be described as a case of EM if such a mechanism were working on the basis of observation and of inference. For, only if that were the case, EM could arise, as we have seen in the previous section. Yet, if that were the case, then that mechanism would not count as a mechanism that can sustain anything relevantly similar to introspective awareness of one's own mental states. For, as we have seen, introspective awareness is here understood in the minimal sense of awareness of one's own mental states that is neither observational nor inferential.
To conclude, even if telepathy were possible and, moreover, it were a case of introspective awareness of someone else's mental states, it could not give rise to counterexamples to the thesis that introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are IEM.
Let us now return to the case of thought insertion and suppose that a genuine first-person claim be made. So X says, "I am thinking 'Kill God.'" Now, this report is perfectly in order. For the schizophrenic subject is actually thinking that thought and she is self-ascribing it. If she goes on to wonder whether it really is she who is thinking that thought, then this does not show that she is or can be introspectively aware of someone else's thoughts and thus rationally wonder whether a certain thought is her own. For, after all, the phenomenon of thought insertion is taken to be a symptom of schizophrenia. Thus, we do not want to end up saying either that she is actually introspectively aware of someone else's mental states or that she could be and would thus be justified in wondering whether that thought is her own.
10 Nor, by the same token, does this show that her first-person report is affected by EM or that it could be. In fact, at times, Campbell himself seems to realize that introspective awareness of a mental state is enough to make it one's own. He writes:
The thought inserted into the subject's mind is indeed in some sense his, just because it has been successfully inserted into his mind; it has some special relation to him. He has, for example, some especially direct knowledge of it [italics mine]. On the other hand, there is, the patient insists, a sense in which the thought is not his, a sense in which the thought is someone else's. . . . (Campbell 1999, 610) 11 So, by Campbell's own lights, the fact that the subject has "some specially direct knowledge" of the thought is enough to make it her own. Still, Campbell seems to think that the best way of explaining the subject's attribution of the thought to someone else would be in terms of an error of identification. However, if I am right, it is not true that this is the best way of describing the phenomenon of thought insertion. Yet, to avoid Campbell's solution, not only must it be shown that it does not make sense to suppose that the phenomenon of thought insertion should be described as a case of EM. Rather, an alternative explanation must be provided.
A Redescription of Thought Insertion
Let us fix some terminology by distinguishing between the ownership of a thought, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the sense of ownership (see Campbell 1999, 617) or of authorship or of agency over one's thoughts.
12 Introspective awareness of a thought is the criterion for the ownership of that thought, if the arguments in the previous sections are correct. By contrast, by "sense of ownership (or of authorship, or of agency)," I understand the fact that the conscious thoughts one is introspectively aware of are often experienced as being a product of the rest of one's own cognitive life and as connected to one's further thoughts and actions.
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Let us dwell on this choice of terminology. If the arguments in the previous sections are correct, then any mental state one is introspectively aware of is one's own. By contrast, the sense of ownership/authorship/agency is a relation a subject has toward her own thoughts. Thus, the relation of ownership is presupposed and, therefore, must be characterized independently of the relation of the sense of ownership/authorship/ agency. In favor of the independence between the relation of ownership and that of the sense of ownership, consider the case of episodic thoughts. These thoughts do not seem to play any further role in our cognitive lives; they do not connect with other thoughts, emotions, and actions, and they do not seem to be the product of antecedent thoughts of ours. Yet, nobody would deny that they are the subject's own thoughts, although, while having them, she does not really experience herself as their owner/author/agent. To sum up, introspective awareness of a thought is the criterion of ownership of that thought. So each thought one is introspectively aware of is one's own. Yet, among some thoughts we are introspectively aware of, some are also experienced as connected to the rest of our cognitive lives and our actions. Hence, by having them we also experience ourselves as their owners (or agents or authors). Still, we can also be introspectively aware of thoughts that we do not experience as integrated in the rest of our cognitive lives, but that would nevertheless count as our own thoughts.
Let us now clarify the constraints to which an explanation of thought insertion should be subject: (1) It should be able to make some sense of the patients' reports. (2) It should not, however, deny that these patients possess the thoughts they disown. Otherwise, the patients' reports will be correct after all and we could not take them as characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia. Now, the notion of error through misidentification totally fails with respect to (1), as we have seen. Nor would the notion of sense of ownership/authorship/agency do, if it were turned into a criterion of ownership. For, if the sense of ownership/authorship/agency were taken to be a criterion of ownership, its lack would turn a thought one is introspectively aware of into a thought that is not one's own. But, then, if we were to explain the reports characteristic of thought insertion by appealing to the sense of ownership/authorship/agency so conceived, we should take the patients' reports as correct, after all. Thus (2) would not be met.
Yet, it seems to me that if we do not turn the sense of ownership/authorship/agency into a criterion for a thought's being one's own, then we can meet both (1) and (2). In fact, the lack of the sense of ownership/authorship/agency does not turn the thoughts schizophrenic patients are introspectively aware of into thoughts that are not their own. Hence, we do not run the risk of having to take the reports characteristic of thought insertion as correct. Therefore, (2) is met. Moreover, we can use the notion of sense of ownership/authorship/agency to provide some understanding of the schizophrenic patients' reports at least in the following sense: We can hold that the lack of a sense of ownership/authorship/agency, produced in some subjects by whatever reasonseither explainable at the personal or at the subpersonal level-14 leads to a detachment with respect to one's own thoughts which, in extreme cases, can lead to the attribution of these thoughts to someone else. Now, this last passage-from the loss of the sense of ownership to the positive attribution of the thought to someone else-may also be explained (or reconstructed) at a phenomenological level, following Lynn Stephens and Graham (2000, 172-6 ). For they submit that when thoughts are not experienced as one's own and yet are experienced as nested in a net of beliefs and desires, which, in turn, are not recognized by the subject as her own, then they can also be experienced as a product of alien intentionality. This, in turn, can be seen as the path that may eventually lead to the attribution of thoughts to another person. Again, however, we must be careful not to turn these phenomenological remarks, which are useful in making some sense of what schizophrenic patients are doing, into crite-ria of ownership of a thought. For, then, we would turn the patients' reports into fully sensible and rational claims, thus violating our second constraint on any explanation of thought insertion.
To conclude and summarize, a loss of a sense of ownership (or authorship, or agency) over one's thoughts does not make the thoughts one is introspectively aware of someone else's, nor is it sufficient for making them not to be one's own. Nor, and this is the real point, does a loss of a sense of ownership over one's thoughts show that it is logically possible to be introspectively aware of someone else's thoughts or that it is logically possible that the mental states one is introspectively aware of are not one's own. Rather, the alleged counterexample just shows that there is more to the phenomenology of conscious thought than the mere having a thought in one's stream of consciousness. Hence, we can see that although the nonschizophrenic subject not only has some thoughts in her stream of consciousness, she also experiences them as belonging to herself, and as integrated in her own psychological life; the schizophrenic subject has a phenomenologically different experience. That is to say, she lacks the experience of her thoughts as belonging to a unitary subject and as integrated in her own cognitive life.
Still a phenomenological difference does not produce a logical one. Thus, even if there were a community whose members were all prone to disown the thoughts occurring in their stream of consciousness because they do not feel them to be their own (or because they do not recognize themselves as their agents), this would not mean that these thoughts would not be theirs, that is, thought by them and introspectively accessible only to them. Therefore, we can conclude that the phenomenon of thought insertion is not a counterexample to the view that if someone makes a psychological self-ascription on the basis of introspection, then her judgment is logically IEM.
Conclusions
As noticed in the Introduction, Campbell's paper contains interesting claims that have wide interdisciplinary implications. He is using a fairly precise philosophical notion to describe one of the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia. Moreover, he thinks that those very symptoms may be used to contradict the philosophical dogma that introspection-based mental self-ascriptions are logically IEM. Yet, if I am right, neither of these claims is true. Still, this does not amount to a denial of the interdisciplinary consequences that an integrated study of thought insertion can have. For, on the one hand, philosophy can still provide notions, which are useful in describing the phenomenon of thought insertion properly, such as the notion of sense of ownership (or authorship or agency) over one's thoughts. On the other hand, taking into account peculiar phenomena that are witnessed in psychiatric literature can be useful to highlight the characteristic features of conscious thought.
Notes
1. The labels error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification were introduced in the philosophical literature by Shoemaker (1968) in connection with Wittgenstein's distinction between uses of I as object and as subject, respectively (see Wittgenstein 1958, 66-7) . These notions have been elaborated at length in Evans (1982) , Peacocke (1983) , Pryor (1998), and Wright (1998) .
2. Also, mental self-ascriptions that are based on observation and inference can be affected by EM (see Evans 1982, 219-20) .
3. Different characterizations of IEM can be found in Evans (1982 ) and, especially, Pryor (1998 . Evans agrees with the spirit of our definition, but adds the constraint that the judgment be based on a way of gaining information directly from objects. By contrast, Pryor distinguishes between de-re IEM, which is relevantly similar to our definition of IEM, and which-IEM. According to Pryor, which-EM arises when a judgment is not based on any belief in an identification component. I do not think that which-EM and which-IEM are sound notions. The basic problem with them is that they depend on a view of the possible ingredients of the identification component that is too narrow. Yet, a critical discussion of these notions falls outside the scope of this paper. For a discussion, see Coliva (2001) .
4. Shoemaker (1968) distinguishes also between circumstantial and absolute IEM. Such a distinction can be interpreted as having to do with the fact that a judgment's being IEM is not so much a function of its subject matter as it is a function of the grounds on which it is made. Hence, certain judgements are liable to EM when made on certain grounds and are IEM when made on different ones. The usual example is that of bodily self-ascriptions that, if made on the basis of observation, can be EM and are IEM instead if they are made on the basis of somatic proprioception. Absolute IEM judgements, according to Shoemaker, are those judgements that are always IEM. Characteristically, they would be mental self-ascriptions. Yet, it is dubious that there are mental self-ascriptions that are always IEM; as Evans (1982) has shown, mental selfascriptions made on inferential grounds are liable to EM. 5. A positive characterization of introspective awareness of one's own mental states falls beyond the scope of this paper. For an illuminating discussion see Peacocke (1999 Chapter 6).
6. Contrast this with self-ascriptions based on somatic proprioception, which are only de facto IEM.
7. This also explains why Peacocke (1983) is right to characterize the first person concept as that concept which (at least in part) is used in judgments on the basis of the evidence that the person with a certain mental state is F. For there must be such an owner and it cannot be but oneself. Hence, the first person concept refers to the same subject who has the relevant mental state and who is necessarily the same as the subject who could self-ascribe that mental state on the basis of introspective awareness of that mental state.
8. Frith 1992: 66 quoted in Campbell 1999: 609. Other examples can be found in Lynn Stephens and Graham 2000: 120. 9. Fulford (1989, 221) states "The experience of one's own thoughts being influenced is like thought insertion to the extent that it is something that is 'done or happens' to one . . . [but] that which is being done is simply the influencing of one's thoughts; whereas in the case of thought insertion it is (bizarrely) the thinking itself."
10. This point is crucial. There will be more about the rationale behind it in the following.
11. Notice that when Campbell writes that the thought has been successfully inserted into the subject's mind, he must not be taken literally; otherwise, the schizophrenic patient would, after all, be right in saying that the thought is not her own. But, then, she would not be schizophrenic but sane! 12. Campbell himself writes: "[W]hen things go wrong, as with the schizophrenic . . . . The sense of ownership of the occurrent thought will be disturbed too" (1999, 617) . And finally, "[T]he form of words I am recommending-that the schizophrenic has introspective knowledge of a thought of which he does not recognise himself to be the agent [italics mine]-does best elucidate the content of the illusion of thought insertion. . . . "
13. My understanding of the sense of ownership/ authorship/agency seems to me to be compatible with Lynn Stephens and Graham's notion of sense of agency (2000, Ch. 8).
14. Campbell gives an explanation of the loss of the sense of ownership at a subpersonal level (see 1999, 611-22) . It is not our concern to assess it. Rather, our aim is to see whether the phenomenon of thought insertion is a counterexample to the view that noninferential mental self-ascriptions are logically IEM. Notice, however, that one might try to give an alternative explanation of the loss of sense of ownership over one's thoughts at the personal level.
